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Abstract There are some interesting similarities between Aristotle’s ‘mixed actions’ in 
Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics and the actions often thought to be justifiable with 
the Doctrine of Double Effect. Here I analyse these similarities by comparing Aristotle’s 
examples of mixed actions with standard cases from the literature on double effect such 
as, amongst others, strategic bombing, the trolley problem, and craniotomy. I find that, 
despite some common features such as the dilemmatic structure and the inevitability of a 
bad effect, Aristotle’s mixed actions do not count as cases justifiable through application 
of the Doctrine of Double Effect because they fail to meet the crucial necessary condition 
of the Doctrine according to which the bad effect can only be a merely foreseen side-
effect and not an intended means. 
 
The Doctrine of Double Effect1 is normally traced back to Aquinas. The 
attribution of the Doctrine of Double Effect to Aquinas’s treatment of self-defence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Here I will just assume previous knowledge of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and restrict my 
discussion of the actual principle to this footnote with the following representative definitions: 
- Aquinas, which is often credited with the first explicit version of DDE: “Nothing hinders one act 
from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention” 
(Summa II-II, 64, 7); 
- Gury: “It is licit to posit a cause which is either good or indifferent from which there follows a 
twofold effect, one good, there other evil, if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the 
end of the agent is honourable – that is, if he does not intend the evil effect” (Boyle’s translation 
1980: 528); 
- Mangan: “A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and a bad 
effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1) that the action in 
itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good effect and not the evil 
effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 4) that 
there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect” (1949: 43). 
- McIntyre in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “sometimes it is permissible to bring 
about as a merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring 
about intentionally” (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/double-effect//); 
- Woodward in the Introduction to his standard anthology on DDE: “intentional production of 
evil... and foreseen but unintentional production of evil” (2001: 2); I have written extensively on 
double effect elsewhere, see Di Nucci 2012a, Di Nucci 2013a, Di Nucci 2013b, Di Nucci 2013c, 
Di Nucci 2014a, and Di Nucci (forthcoming a). 
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Summa II has sometimes been denied (notably by Anscombe), but Double Effect is not 
normally thought to go further back than Aquinas. Only recently scholars have started to 
point out a possible connection between the Doctrine of Double Effect and Aristotle’s 
discussion of action in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics (Pakaluk 20112). 
In discussing hekousion and akousion (normally translated with ‘voluntary’ and 
‘involuntary’), Aristotle offers some examples – of what he calls ‘mixed actions’ - which 
are strikingly similar to the sort of examples which are put forward in discussions of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect.  
Here are Aristotle’s two examples in the classic translation of Ross (1925): 
...if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and children in 
his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to 
death...  
Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a 
storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily; but on condition of its 
securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. (1110a5-20) 
 
Let us look at the similarities between those two examples: both cases are such 
that the agent is under external pressure to do something that she would normally not do 
– ‘do something base’ and ‘throw goods overboard’. Both are cases where capitulating to 
the external pressure appears to be prima facie morally preferable to not capitulating: ‘do 
something base or your family will be killed’ and ‘throw goods overboard or you and 
your crew will die’. In this respect the latter example is even clearer than the former, 
contrasting goods with persons; the former is more problematic because we may imagine 
base things that are not prima facie outweighed by rescuing one’s family. 
We may indeed for both examples talk of two effects or consequences: doing 
something base against rescuing my family in the first case; and throwing goods 
overboard against rescuing myself and my crew in the second case.3 These cases are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See also tinyurl.com/7p722gy. This blog post and Pakaluk’s piece are the only two cases known 
to me in which this suggestion is made.  
3 A peculiarity of the second example is that, supposedly, if I did not throw goods overboard to 
rescue myself and my crew, the goods would still get lost in the shipwreck. This is like imagining 
that, in the first example, the tyrant would tell me that if I did not do something base, then he 
would kill my family and also bring about that very same base thing. This does indeed make a 
possibly significant difference, both action-theoretically and morally, so that it is just best to 
imagine a case in which, if I did not throw the goods overboard, myself and the crew would die 
but the goods would be somehow saved (maybe to avoid shipwreck I must throw the goods 
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similar to Double Effect cases in that in both cases there is a prima facie good effect – 
rescuing my family and rescuing my crew - and a prima facie bad (or evil) effect – doing 
something base and throwing goods overboard.  
Here I first explain what Aristotle means by ‘mixed actions’ by looking at his 
discussion of hekousion in NE III and then compare mixed actions with the standard 
scenarios in the double effect literature.  
 
1. Aristotle 
Aristotle thinks that these sorts of actions are ‘mixed’ because they are both 
hekousion and akousion (voluntary and involuntary). Here is the passage on mixed 
actions in full: 
But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. 
if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and children in his power, 
and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be 
debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also 
with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods 
away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible 
man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are 
worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the 
occasion. Both the terms, then, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, must be used with reference to the 
moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental 
parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a 
man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the 
abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself (1110a5-20). 
 
Here we must briefly say something about Aristotle’s general discussion of 
hekousion in NE III.1 and III.2. Aristotle distinguishes between at least five kinds of 
actions: 
a) Chosen actions 
b) Voluntary actions 
c) Not voluntary actions 
d) Involuntary actions 
e) Mixed actions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overboard here and now, and if I don’t the ship will sink there and then, and here the goods 
cannot be recovered by divers but there the goods can be recovered. The peculiarity discussed 
here is pointed out by Pakaluk (2011: 215) as well, who does not though suggest reading the 
second example as I do here.  
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Aristotle starts with (d), involuntary actions: “Those things, then, are thought 
involuntary, which take place by force or owing to ignorance” (1110a1). This is pretty 
intuitive: the only thing to note is perhaps that, in the contemporary action theory 
literature, what happens as the result of physical coercion is normally distinguished by 
behaving in ignorance. Davidson (1963, 1971, 1978), the trailblazer of contemporary 
causalism, holds that some movement is an action only if it is intentional under at least 
one description. On this account, movements that happen under physical coercion 
(Aristotle’s own example is “if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men 
who had him in their power” (1110a2)) are intentional under no description; therefore 
these movements are not actions, following Davidson.  
On the other hand, on Davidson’s account, cases of ignorance will count as 
actions, precisely unintentional actions. Oedipus knowingly kills the man at the junction 
and unknowingly kills his father. Here killing his father is unintentional because Oedipus 
does not know (nor does he believe) that the man at the junction is his father; but it is an 
action because it is intentional under another legitimate description, namely killing the 
man at the junction. So this is an example, on Davidson’s account, of unintentional 
action. And this is different from the examples of physical coercion because those are not 
even actions. 
Aristotle also distinguishes between involuntary actions and actions that are 
simply not voluntary: “Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it 
is only what produces pain and repentance that is involuntary” (1110b18-25). After 
having offered various examples of involuntary actions, Aristotle puts forward a 
definition of voluntary action: “Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason 
of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving 
principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the 
action” (1111a21).4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I did not want to unnecessarily complicate this discussion, but there may be still another sixth 
kind of action in Aristotle’s text, distinct from the five discussed here: “Acting by reason of 
ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a 
rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not 
knowingly but in ignorance” (emphasis in the original, 1110b-25). Here the distinction seems to 
be between ignorance is the sense of not knowing, like Oedipus; and ignorance in the sense of a 
sort of unawareness or unconsciousness, like the drunk. These two are genuinely different, and it 
is an interesting open question what the contemporary causal account that we have been 
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David Charles (1984) in his book on Aristotle’s philosophy of action formalises 
Aristotle’s voluntary action as follows:  
z is a voluntary action of S’s at t1 iff 
(1) z is a bodily movement of S’s at t1; 
(2) S knows the relevant particulars involved in doing z (what he is doing at t1; to whom; 
with what: 1110b33); and 
(3) z is caused efficiently by one of S’s desires at t1 (1980: 58).5 
 
This formulation is interestingly similar to the kind of Humean causal account of 
action Davidson puts forward in Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963 – and indeed there 
Davidson takes himself to be defending an “ancient” (1963: 4) view, referring 
presumably to Aristotle). In this respect it is then no surprise that Charles thinks that 
‘voluntary’ action in Aristotle is intentional action.  But there is an important technical 
difference: Davidson’s account is left as a set of necessary conditions because of deviant 
counterexamples. Presumably Charles’s formulation of Aristotle’s account, given as a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions, would also be subject to deviant counterexamples 
(1963: 12 and also Davidson’s essay Freedom to Act (1973))6. 
Voluntary actions, according to Aristotle, can be attributed to children and other 
animals too, and Aristotle introduces a further kind that seems to be reserved only to 
adult human agents, (a) choice: “Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been 
delimited, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with 
virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do. Choice, then, seems to be 
voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For 
both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparing Aristotle to has to say about the case of the drunk, who does not seem to act 
intentionally under any description, but who will have to be hold responsible for the damage that 
she might cause (for more on this, see my work in action theory and free will: Di Nucci 2008, Di 
Nucci 2009, Di Nucci 2010a, Di Nucci 2010b, Di Nucci 2011a, Di Nucci 2011b, Di Nucci 2011c, 
Di Nucci 2012b, Di Nucci 2013d, Di Nucci 2013e, Di Nucci 2013f, Di Nucci 2014b, and Di 
Nucci (forthcoming b)). 
5 Charles revises the third condition twice: „(3)’ z is caused by S’s desire to do a z-type action 
either for its own sake or as the means to achieving a further goal which he desires for its own 
sake… (3)’’ z is an action which is caused either by S’s desire to do a z-type action (for itself or 
derivatively) or by his desire to do a y-type action (for itself or derivatively), when S knows that 
in doing y he is also doing z” (1984: 61). Here I shall ignore the possible circularity in 3’’.  
6 For a recent introduction to deviant counterexamples see Stout (2010). 
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done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen” (1111b5-
10).7 
 
Having now looked at Aristotle’s understanding of action, we have a better idea of 
why Aristotle claims that ‘mixed actions’ are voluntary: the agent is neither physically 
coerced to act in the case of ‘mixed actions’ nor does the agent act in ignorance. Less 
clear, it would seem, is why Aristotle says that ‘mixed actions’ are also in some sense 
involuntary. But take notice of the following two aspects: firstly, mixed actions are also, 
in an important way, forced upon the agent. Even though the agent is not physically 
coerced as when she may be carried by the wind, the agent is forced by the circumstances 
to act the way she does.8 Take the tyrant’s example: the point is that it is only because of 
the tyrant’s threat that the agent may consider doing something base. And that it is only 
because of the threat of the storm that the agent will throw goods overboard. Secondly, 
Aristotle says in distinguishing involuntary actions from actions that are merely not 
voluntary, that involuntary action requires “pain and repentance”; mixed actions are 
certainly also a cause of pain; and the sort of difficult choices involved may provoke 
sometimes repentance and almost always lingering doubts.  
Aristotle’s suggestion, then, is that mixed actions are voluntary actions that have 
important features in common with involuntary actions: external circumstances force the 
agent in a dilemmatic situation out of which the agent cannot come without some bad 
consequences. Indeed, even when the balance of reasons may be clear as in the case of 
throwing goods overboard, the agent’s only way out of the difficult situation involves 
some necessary bad consequences. Those are the very features of the sort of cases that are 
often tackled by the Doctrine of Double Effect: dilemma situations where there are no 
good effects without bad effects.  
There is another similarity between Aristotle’s mixed actions and standard cases 
from the literature on double effect: we have seen that Aristotle says that mixed actions 
are hekousion but also, in some sense, akousion. And we have seen that Charles’s seminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This has the interesting consequence that if we follow Charles in taking Aristotle’s voluntary 
actions to be what current philosophy of action refers to as intentional actions, then animals and 
children would, according to Aristotle, be capable of acting intentionally – which is a pretty 
strong thesis (on this point see Steward 2009, Glock 2009, and Stoecker 2009).  
8 See also Pakaluk’s discussion of mixed actions and necessitation (2011: 218).  
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treatment of Aristotle’s action theory takes hekousion to be intentional action. At the 
same time we find, in discussions on double effect (see for example in the next section 
Bratman 1987), that the actions that the Doctrine is supposed to justify (Strategic 
Bomber’s killing of the children, say) are intentional but not intended.9 
Let us now look at some classic double effect cases and compare them to 
Aristotle’s mixed actions.  
 
2. Double Effect 
Aristotle’s two cases are strikingly similar to the classic examples in the Double 
Effect debate. I will mention here five kinds of examples which I take to be the most 
common ones10: 
1) Terror Bombing 
A good illustration of this case is provided by Bratman (1987): 
Both Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the goal of promoting the war effort 
against Enemy. Each intends to pursue this goal by weakening Enemy, and each intends 
to do that by dropping bombs. Terror Bomber’s plan is to bomb the school in Enemy’s 
territory, thereby killing children of Enemy and terrorizing Enemy’s population. Strategic 
Bomber’s plan is different. He plans to bomb Enemy’s munitions plant, thereby 
undermining Enemy’s war effort. Strategic Bomber also knows, however, that next to the 
munitions plant is a school, and that when he bombs the plant he will also destroy the 
school, killing the children inside. Strategic Bomber has not ignored this fact. Indeed, he 
has worried a lot about it. Still, he has concluded that this cost, though significant, is 
outweighed by the contribution that would be made to the war effort by the destruction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Here issues become quite quickly complicated and technical, as some authors on double effect 
take the actions that the Doctrine can justify to be intentional but unintended (like Bratman) while 
others take those actions to be full-blown unintentional. Importantly, here, there is no agreement 
in current philosophy of action on the notions of ‘intentional’ and ‘intended’. Some endorse the 
so-called Simple View, according to which every intentional action is intended on exactly the 
same description under which it is intentional (see, for example, Adams 1986 and McCann 1991). 
Most deny the Simple View, either because intentional actions must not necessarily be intended 
under their intentional description (see Bratman’s Single Phenomenon View, 1984 & 1987 or 
because intentional actions must not necessarily be preceded by any intention (see for example 
Hursthouse 1991, Pollard 2003 & 2006, (also my own already cited work). Here I can’t go into 
these sorts of detailed discussions, I just wanted to emphasize the common ‘ambiguous’ character 
of Aristotle’s mixed actions and the actions justified by the Doctrine.  
10 These five cases are for example cited by McIntyre in her introduction to Double Effect for the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (she adds self-sacrifice to the list). Nothing really hangs on 
whether all of these cases are proper illustrations of double effect (self-defence may not be, for 
example): I mention them as illustrative of the Doctrine and of the debate and as cases that are 
similar to Aristotle’s two examples.  
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the munitions plant. Now, Terror Bomber intends all of the features of his action just 
noted: he intends to drop the bombs, kill the children, terrorize the population, and 
thereby weaken Enemy. In contrast, it seems that Strategic Bomber only intends to drop 
the bombs, destroy the munitions plant, and weaken Enemy. Although he knows that by 
bombing the plant he will be killing the children, he does not, it seems, intend to kill 
them. Whereas killing the children is, for Terror Bomber, an intended means to his end of 
victory, it is, for Strategic Bomber, only something he knows he will do by bombing the 
munitions plant. Though Strategic Bomber has taken the deaths of the children quite 
seriously into account in his deliberation, these deaths are for him only an expected side 
effect; they are not – in contrast with Terror Bomber’s position – intended as a means... 
In saying this I do not deny that Strategic Bomber kills the children intentionally. (1987: 
139-140)11 
2) Trolley Problem 
The Trolley Problem was first introduced by Foot (196712) even though its most 
influential formulation is Thomson’s (1976 & 1985) variation on Foot’s original case. 
In that case you have been strolling by the trolley track, and you can see the situation at a 
glance: The driver saw the five on the track ahead, he stamped on the brakes, the brakes 
failed, so he fainted. What to do? Well, here is the switch, which you can throw, thereby 
turning the trolley yourself. Of course you will kill one if you do. But I should think you 
may turn it all the same (1985: 1397). 
Consider a case - which I shall call Fat Man - in which you are stand-ing on a footbridge 
over the trolley track. You can see a trolley hurtling down the track, out of control. You 
turn around to see where the trolley is headed, and there are five workmen on the track 
where it exits from under the footbridge. What to do? Being an expert on trolleys, you 
know of one certain way to stop an out-of-control trolley: Drop a really heavy weight in 
its path. But where to find one? It just so happens that standing next to you on the 
footbridge is a fat man, a really fat man. He is leaning over the railing, watching the 
trolley; all you have to do is to give him a little shove, and over the railing he will go, 
onto the track in the path of the trolley (1985: 1409). 
3) Craniotomy 
Here we can go back to Foot’s influential discussion (1967): 
It is said for instance that the operation of hysterectomy involves the death of the foetus 
as the foreseen but not strictly or directly intended consequence of the surgeon’s act, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 On this scenario see also at least Bennett 1980. For each of the five kinds of cases that I present 
here, there is significant literature. As here I will only mention the most significant examples, the 
reader may want to additionally consult The Doctrine of Double Effect organized bibliography at 
philpapers.org: http://philpapers.org/browse/the-doctrine-of-double-effect/.   
12 “…he is the driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer from one narrow track to another; 
five men are working on one track and one man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is 
bound to be killed... The question is why we should say, without hesitation, that the driver should 
steer for the less occupied track” (1967: 147) 
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while other operations kill the child and count as the direct intention of taking an innocent 
life, a distinction that has evoked particularly bitter reactions on the part of non-Catholics. 
If you are permitted to bring about the death of the child, what does it matter how it is 
done? The doctrine of the double effect is also used to show why in another case, where a 
woman in labor will die unless a craniotomy operation is performed; the intervention is 
not to be condoned. There, it is said, we may not operate but must let the mother die. We 
foresee her death but do not directly intend it, whereas to crush the skull of the child 
would count as direct intention of its death. 
4) Death-inducing pain-alleviation 
This is another classic of the literature on double effect, even though there is 
overwhelming evidence that the sort of dosages of opioid drugs which are effective 
against pain do not actually hasten death (Sykes and Thorns 2003). 
A doctor who intends to hasten the death of a terminally ill patient by injecting a large 
dose of morphine would act impermissibly because he intends to bring about the patient’s 
death. However, a doctor who intended to relieve the patient’s pain with that same dose 
and merely foresaw the hastening of the patient’s death would act permissibly (McIntyre, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).  
5) Self-defence 
In this case we may just go back directly to Aquinas: “Nothing hinders one act 
from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the 
intention. (…) Accordingly, the act of self-defence may have two effects: one, the saving 
of one’s life; the other, the slaying of the aggressor.” (Summa II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7) 
 
Let us now compare these classic examples from the Double Effect literature to 
Aristotle’s two examples. Notice the similarity between, say, Strategic Bomber and 
Aristotle’s captain. Both do things that might be thought to be absolutely forbidden (at 
least relatively to their role). Both do them unwillingly. Both seem to think that their 
wider goal is worth the sacrifice: in Strategic Bomber’s case the wider goal of weakening 
enemy is supposedly worth the sacrifice of killing the children; and in Aristotle’s 
Captain’s case the wider goal of guaranteeing the safety of the crew is supposedly worth 
the sacrifice of the cargo. And in both cases we can imagine alternative characters who 
might do the thing in question willingly: Terror Bomber on the one hand, and a Captain 
who might want to compromise the profitability of that particular route by throwing 
goods overboard. Also, importantly, Aristotle endorses the captain’s throwing goods 
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overboard by saying that “any sensible man does so” just as the Doctrine of Double 
Effect provides a justification for what Strategic Bomber does.13  
I will not go through the comparison of Aristotle’s examples with all of the 
aforementioned scenarios, but just summarize the structural similarities: 
 
Scenario Good Effect Bad Effect 
Doing something base Family is saved The base thing 
Throwing goods Crew is saved Goods are lost 
Strategic Bomber Factory is destroyed Children are killed 
Trolley Bystander Five are saved One is killed 
Hysterectomy Mother is saved Foetus is killed 
Pain-alleviation Pain relief Death is hastened 
Self-defence I am saved Attacker is killed 
While it is not in all cases clear that the good effect is prima facie to be preferred 
to the bad effect, it is in all cases clear that there is a prima facie good effect and a prima 
facie bad effect.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Here it is again worth emphasising the disanalogy between Aristotle’s two examples: while 
Aristotle endorses the throwing of goods overboard, it is not clear that Aristotle would also 
endorse doing something base to save your family. Indeed, Aristotle states that “...some acts, 
perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful 
sufferings” (NE III.1 49). But that is not a problem, as the example involving doing something 
base to placate a tyrant is left open without specifying what the base deed should be (so that only 
the good effect is morally clear and assessable – saving one’s family – while the bad effect is left 
as a variable. Pakaluk for example suggests that Aristotle may rather tend not to endorse doing 
something base for the sake of saving one’s family, providing some Socratic applications: “Often 
it is supposed that Aristotle is presuming that the agent will act to save his family, and yet the 
passage gives no grounds for holding this. Actually, there is no need to suppose that Aristotle 
even meant to suggest a ‘right’ answer to the dilemma, which serves its purpose if both 
alternatives appear unpalatable. But suppose the dilemma was formulated in the Academy as an 
intensification of dilemmas that Socrates faced—its being wondered how Socrates would have 
acted in these more trying circumstances—then it is natural to think that Aristotle, if, as seems 
right, he took Socrates as a model of virtuous action, would at least have taken seriously that the 
agent should refuse to do the shameful thing. The two cases actually faced by Socrates were: the 
Thirty Tyrants commanded him to arrest an innocent man, and he refused; his friends tried to 
persuade him to escape from prison for the sake of caring for his family, and he refused. These 
dilemmas are intensified if one imagines that it is not Socrates but those he cares for who will 
suffer through his refusal to heed the Tyrants’ command, or that the cost of his refusing to do 
something shameful, such as deliberately break the law in escaping from prison, was not merely 
that his family suffer from his absence, but also that they be tortured and killed” (Pakaluk 2011: 
215-16). 
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Pakaluk suggests in relation to the case in which one’s family is hostage to a 
tyrant “if in the second case one refused to do the disgraceful thing, then one might wish 
to defend this by an appeal to DE [Double Effect], claiming that the death of one’s 
family, although foreseen, was not intended, an that the agent cannot be held responsible 
for the bad actions of others, when there are merely incidental to what he was aiming to 
do, that is, act always in an upright way: in avoiding the disgraceful action, one both 
gains an honourable good (the kalon) and incurs a loss (of philoi); it makes sense to 
prefer the one over the other; there is no third way out (ex hypothesi); and certainly one 
takes no pleasure in the death of one’s spouse and children” (2011: 215-216). 
This is different from my classification, but it is also a different course of events – 
so that the two are not necessarily incompatible with each other. I have been comparing 
the case in which the agent saves his family with cases of double effect, while Pakaluk 
compares the case in which the agent does not save his family with cases of double effect. 
Here then the bad effect is the death of the family while the good effect is that the agent 
does an honourable thing in refusing to do something base, supposedly.  
There are two things to note about Pakaluk’s alternative reading: firstly, notice 
that here the proposed application of the Doctrine of Double Effect is for an intentional 
omission rather than for an action: the agent refuses or omits to do the base thing; none of 
the standard scenarios in the debate on double effect are such that the Doctrine is used to 
justify an omission; the Doctrine is rather normally used to justify an intervention: think, 
for example, of the bystander who may omit to divert the trolley from the five to the one 
but who, according to the Doctrine, may justifiably divert the trolley from the five to the 
one. Think of the surgeon who may omit to practice a hysterectomy but who, according 
to the Doctrine, may justifiably intervene to save the mother even though that kills the 
foetus.  
Secondly, notice that Pakaluk’s reading depends on supposing that “one both 
gains an honourable good (the kalon) and incurs a loss (of philoi); it makes sense to 
prefer the one over the other” (2011: 216). Here, as we have said, since the course of 
events is different, there is no problem with Pakaluk’s claim that refusing to do 
something base is an honourable good and that losing one’s family is a loss; indeed, the 
two are both very plausible. But Pakaluk’s next claim is less plausible, where he says that 
it makes sense to prefer the honourable good to avoiding the loss. The problem is not just 
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moral intuition, which suggests that most people would probably rather save their family 
than obtain the honourable good of not doing something base (but, again, that does 
depend on what this base action consists in). The problem is rather that this would not be 
a clear cut case, even if we inserted instead of the variable base action something pretty 
bad, say killing someone or betraying an important secret or something like that. 
Normally, in cases of double effect, the prima facie moral balance is, on the other hand, 
very clear: five workers as opposed to one in the trolley problem; or thousands of lives 
saved by shortening the war as opposed to some children in strategic bomber.14  
Another thing that all the Double Effect scenarios have in common is that there 
are parallel cases also involving a comparable good effect and a comparable bad effect 
which do not meet the conditions to be justified by the Doctrine of Double Effect.  
 
Scenario Justified case Unjustified case 
Bomber Strategic Bomber Terror Bomber 
Trolley Bystander Fat Man 
Abortion Hysterectomy Craniotomy 
Euthanasia Pain relief Intended killing 
Killing Self-defence Intended killing 
 
Here the structure of the Double Effect cases starts to emerge: it isn’t simply that 
there are two effects, one good the other bad, and that the good effect overwhelms, at 
least prima facie, the bad effect. That is because those two things are also true of all the 
above cases that are not supposed to be justifiable with the Doctrine. The idea is that, in 
each case, both the justifiable and unjustifiable case are consequentialistically identical 
but that there is an intensional difference between each pair of cases: the justifiable case, 
in each pair, is one in which only the good effect was intended while the bad effect was 
merely foreseen as a side-effect. Namely, the good effect may be an end in itself or a 
means to another good effect, while the bad effect may not be either an end in itself nor a 
means to the good effect – it can only be an unintended side-effect of the good effect. It is 
this intensional difference that is supposed to explain why the Doctrine justifies one but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is, admittedly, not always so clear, as in the hysterectomy case where, at least on the 
supposition that the foetus would otherwise survive, some may not necessarily prioritise the sick 
mother over the healthy foetus. 
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not the other in each pair. So, to cite just one case, Strategic Bomber intends to destroy 
the munitions factory and foresees that destroying the munitions factory (as a means to 
shortening the war) will also cause the death of the children as a side-effect. Strategic 
Bomber does not intend to kill the children either as an end in itself or as a means to 
shortening the war (nor is the death of the children supposed to be, according to double 
effect, a means to destroying the munitions factory). Terror Bomber, on the other hand, 
intends to kill the children as a means to shortening the war. Killing the children is, for 
Terror Bomber, an intended means to his end of shortening the war, and not merely a 
foreseen side-effect of his plan.  
In the next section I will analyse Aristotle’s mixed actions to see whether the 
distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects applies to mixed 
actions. 
 
3. Means and Side-Effects 
Can we apply the distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-
effects to Aristotle’s examples? We may try to say the following: the captain, in throwing 
goods overboard, only intends to save the crew and does not actually intend to throw 
goods overboard: throwing goods overboard is merely a side-effect of saving the crew. 
Similarly, we may say, of the agent who is asked by a tyrant to do something base 
otherwise his family will be killed, that he does not intend to do the base thing, he rather 
only intends to do save his family, and doing the base thing is just a foreseen side-effect 
of saving his family. We may, indeed, try to say the above: but it does not sound as 
plausible as it does with the previously illustrated double effect examples such as 
strategic bombing or Bystander at the Switch. Can we really deny that throwing goods 
overboard is a means to saving the crew? Can we really deny that doing the base thing is 
a means to saving the family? It could be suggested that we look for parallel examples: 
after all, it may be said, to say that Strategic Bomber does not intend to kill the children is 
not in itself plausible; its plausibility depends on contrasting Strategic Bomber with 
Terror Bomber, who clearly intends to kill the children. What are, then, the equivalent 
parallel cases for Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions? 
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Let us take throwing goods overboard. Take an alternative captain who may throw 
goods overboard because he wants to compromise the profitability of the route, or 
because he may be opposed to the goods in question (suppose they are transporting 
alcohol or neuroenhancements). The consequences of the two cases are supposed to be 
the same: the ship’s cargo is lost. And we can certainly say that the two captains have 
different attitudes to throwing goods overboard. But is this difference in attitude a matter 
of intention? It seems to be rather a matter of having different reasons or goals: 
Aristotle’s captain’s goal is to save the crew; the new captain’s goal is to prevent the 
dissemination of intoxifying substances. We may argue about who has the morally 
preferable goal, but, again, the difference does seem to be in their goal and not in their 
intending to throw goods overboard. It seems, indeed, that in both cases the captains 
intend to throw goods overboard as a means to their respective goals of saving the crew 
and preventing the dissemination of intoxifying substances. We may try to say that 
Aristotle’s captain does not really intend to throw the goods overboard because he would 
no longer throw goods overboard if the tempest would quiet down. But this strategy does 
not go very far, because the other captain would also no longer throw the goods 
overboard if he realises that he is actually carrying medicines; or maybe he reads a 
convincing argument in favour of the use of neuroenhancements. The counterfactuals are 
similarly close in both cases. 
What would Aristotle’s case have to look like so that we may convincingly talk of 
side-effects as opposed to means? Before attempting to modify Aristotle’s example, we 
should look at his other scenario, involving someone who has been blackmailed by a 
tyrant to do something base: if he does not comply, the tyrant will execute his family. 
Suppose that the one in question is a security official and that the base thing in question is 
to reveal a sensitive secret to the tyrant. Can we say that, when the security official passes 
the relevant information to the enemy, he does not intend to do so and that passing 
information to the enemy is not a means to saving his family but only a side-effect of 
saving his family? Again, that does not seem convincing, and this impression does not 
change even when we contrast our security official with another one who simply betrays 
his country for money. Again, they have different attitudes in that they have different 
reasons or goals; but that does not seem enough to be able to say that the former official 
does not pass on information as an intended means to save his family. 
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Maybe, it could be objected, we are just comparing Aristotle’s examples to the 
wrong double effect case. Maybe if we compare them to a different case, we will get the 
relevant similarity. In this respect, self-defence looks promising. Indeed, Aristotle’s case 
of doing a base thing does not seem far from a case of self-defence, as the victim is 
defending his own family from a threat. The structure is similar: if I don’t do something 
that is prima facie base, such as killing or passing sensitive information to the enemy, I 
will lose something that is paramount to me (either my own life or the life of my 
children). Indeed, why think that the emergency in the case of self-defence is greater: 
most people would probably prioritize the life of their children over their own life. How 
is double effect supposed to justify self-defence and can we apply the same justification 
to Aristotle’s case? In applying the Doctrine of Double Effect to self-defence we would 
probably say something like the following: I did not really intend to kill the attacker, I 
only intended to save my own life. And we can indeed say of Aristotle’s example that the 
agent did not really intend to pass on the sensitive information, he only intended to save 
the life of his children. But the problem was that we cannot plausibly say that the agent 
did not pass sensitive information to the enemy as a means to saving the life of his 
children. Similarly, though, we cannot plausibly say that the victim who kills in self-
defence does not kill the attacker as a means to saving his own life.  
Recall Mangan’s Condition 3 in his classic definition of the Doctrine of Double 
Effect: “that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect” (1949:43). The 
evil effect is not allowed to be a means to the good effect: so the killing of the attacker 
(bad effect) cannot be a means to saving my own life (good effect), and the base betrayal 
of my country (bad effect) cannot be a means to saving the life of my children (good 
effect). What that shows, though, is not just that Aristotle’s example does not meet 
Condition 3 of the Doctrine of Double Effect. It also shows that the standard account of 
self-defence fails to meet Condition 3 of the Doctrine of Double Effect. And, after all, if 
the Doctrine’s most influential example is Aquinas’s discussion of self-defence, it cannot 
be that self-defence does not fit the Doctrine. Should we then just drop condition 3? 
This seems to be for example Pakaluk’s position in arguing in favour of a 
significant relationship between Aristotle’s examples and the Doctrine of Double Effect: 
“The class of actions which Aristotle would describe as ‘necessitated’ is evidently the 
very same class to which a DE [Double Effect] analysis would apply. Both involve acting 
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so as to bring about (or not acting to prevent) something bad, in circumstances of 
constraint such that this could not be done except by being responsible for something 
taken to be worse. Suppose there are two goods such that each is reasonably wanted but 
one is correctly preferred to the other, and suppose that circumstances are such that the 
goods have become so bound together that the only action which suffices to preserve the 
one is something which destroys the other; then we may say either that in the 
circumstances the agent is necessitated, by fear of losing the greater good, to act so as to 
destroy what he usually would want to preserve, or that in the circumstances the only 
action by which the agent may, as usual, preserve the greater good happens also to 
destroy the lesser good. An upshot is that DE applies to a much broader range of actions 
than is typically thought” (2011: 224-25). 
Suppose we ignore condition 3 and we say that, just as the attacked did not intend 
to kill the attacker but only intended to save his life, so in Aristotle’s first example I did 
not intend to do the base thing but only intended to save my family and similarly in 
Aristotle’s second example I did not intend to throw the goods overboard but only 
intended to save my crew. The problem is that this is just an endorsement of 
utilitarianism, as the above can be said of all the classic counterexamples to 
utilitarianism. Take the judge who knowingly puts to death an innocent man to avoid a 
riot (Rawls 1955, Foot 1967): the judge did not intend to put to death an innocent man 
but only intended to avoid a riot. Take the surgeon who kills a healthy hospital visitor to 
save five patients in desperate need of organs. The surgeon did not intend to kill the one 
but only intended to save the patients. Even if one thinks that the Doctrine of Double 
Effect is a concession of the absolutist to utilitarian counterexamples, then if there is to be 
anything to the Doctrine of Double Effect then there must be cases that it does not allow 
despite their utility.15  
Pakaluk’s suggestion of extending double effect has exactly the same problem, 
which we can illustrate by looking at his example of the two goods who happen to be 
bound together: “two goods such that each is reasonably wanted but one is correctly 
preferred to the other, and suppose that circumstances are such that the goods have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Here my reference to utilitarianism is admittedly quick and one should really distinguish 
between different possible versions of consequentialist approaches. But my point is just a 
dialectical one and in this respect I don’t think it needs much specifying: dropping condition 3 
makes double effect as unpalatable as its consequentialist alternatives. 
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become so bound together that the only action which suffices to preserve the one is 
something which destroys the other” (2011: 225).  
This is too broad: take the surgeon and the judge. The surgeon is also faced with 
two goods that are bound together: saving the lives of five patients on the one hand and 
not killing the healthy hospital visitor on the other. To use Pakaluk’s own language: the 
circumstances are such that the goods have become so bound together that the only action 
which suffices to preserve the lives of the five patients is something which destroys the 
life of the other. Similarly with the judge: circumstances are such that the goods have 
become so bound together that the only action which suffices to preserve the public peace 
is something which destroys the life of the innocent man.  
So if we water down double effect as proposed by Pakaluk so as to preserve the 
coincidence between Aristotle’s examples and the standard cases of double effect, then 
we have just gone all the way utilitarian. Indeed, Pakaluk’s two goods bound together 
identify just about any genuine dilemma. Sure, the Doctrine of Double Effect can be 
considered, dialectically, to be a sort of concession on the grounds of plausibility that the 
absolutist Kantian makes to utilitarian counterexamples: at least sometimes numbers must 
count, insists the utilitarian. And the Kantian absolutist may reply with the Doctrine of 
Double Effect that indeed sometimes, under the right conditions, numbers can count. But 
if we follow the suggestion discussed above, then numbers always count. But then we 
could no longer distinguish the Doctrine of Double Effect from utilitarianism. And that 
cannot be what the Doctrine of Double Effect was ever meant to do even if, as I said, one 
does concede that the Doctrine could be a compromise position between absolutism and 
utilitarianism.  
In the next section I consider whether there is a plausible interpretation of 
Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions on which they may be equivalent to the sort of 
cases that the Doctrine of Double Effect justifies. 
 
4. Mixed Actions and Double Effect 
The question remains whether we can interpret Aristotle’s examples so that they 
may more plausibly meet condition 3 and be assimilated to the classic scenarios in the 
Double Effect debate that we have been discussing. In order for Aristotle’s captain’s 
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scenario to meet condition 3, it must be the case that the bad effect – throwing goods 
overboard – is not an intended means to the good effect – saving the crew. The bad effect 
of throwing goods overboard must be just a side-effect of saving the crew or of the action 
which results in saving the crew. Indeed, we need not imagine Aristotle’s captain as 
standing on the edge of his ship literally throwing boxes in the water so as to reduce the 
ship’s weight in order to increase the chances of withstanding the storm.  
We may imagine that, in order to withstand the storm, the captain operates a 
sudden turning manoeuvre so as to direct the ship towards less dangerous waters. The 
captain knows that this sudden turning manoeuvre is likely to result in loss of cargo. Still, 
the captain does not want to or intend to lose cargo; he rather wants to and intends to save 
ship and crew from the storm. This scenario appears to be structurally similar to 
prominent side-effects scenarios from the double effect debate, such as Bystander at the 
Switch or Strategic Bomber. The captain foresees loss of cargo but does not intend to get 
rid of his cargo; were there to be a different available manoeuvre with similar 
probabilities to save ship and crew from the storm but which did not involve likely loss of 
cargo, the captain would rather have chosen this other manoeuvre. But this possibility is 
just not there, so that the captain, if he wants to do his best to try and save ship and crew, 
must choose the sudden turning manoeuvre that he knows will likely also cause loss of 
cargo. In this scenario, just like in Bystander at the Switch and the Trolley Problem, loss 
of cargo (the bad effect) appears to be a side-effect of the rapid turning manoeuvre to 
save ship and crew (the good effect).  
Notice the similarity with Bystander at the Switch and the Trolley Problem: 
 
Scenario Action Bad Effect Good Effect 
Aristotle’s 
Captain 
Sudden turning 
manoeuvre 
Loss of cargo Crew is saved 
Bystander Flipping switch One dies Five are saved 
Strategic Bomber Dropping bombs Children are killed War is shortened 
 
Now compare this interpretation of Aristotle’s example to the following 
alternative possibility: the captain has been paid by a rival company to compromise the 
profitability of the route, his ship, and shipping company. Luck has it that the current 
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storm gives the captain the perfect chance to realize his plan without being caught. The 
captain opts for a sudden turning manoeuvre which will according to his calculations 
cause the cargo to fall in the water and be lost at sea. He suddenly turns the ship in order 
to drop as much cargo as possible. As it happens, the captain knows that this manoeuvre 
will also direct the ship towards less dangerous waters and minimize the chances of 
losing members of the crew. But this captain does not really care about that: indeed, he is 
being paid by the rival company in order to compromise his own shipping company. For 
all he knows, the loss of crew members may have also been an effective strategy; but his 
deal involved only loss of cargo and he is personally indifferent to what happens to crew 
members. Now, this captain does not appear to have just lost cargo as a foreseen side-
effect to his attempt to save the crew. On the contrary, he is indifferent to what happens 
to crew members and cares only about getting rid of as much cargo as possible so as to 
increase economic damage to his current employer.  
This story emphasises the side-effect character of the loss of goods in my previous 
interpretation of Aristotle’s example. In this respect, then, given the equivalence between 
my interpretation of Aristotle’s example and Strategic Bomber and Bystander at the 
Switch, then this new story should in turn be equivalent to scenarios such as Terror 
Bomber and Fat Man. But it is not. Here we certainly have an agent who intends the bad 
effect, loss of cargo. But here the bad effect is not an intended means to the good effect, 
saving the crew; while in Fat Man the bad effect – pushing the fat guy down the bridge – 
is a means to the good effect, saving the five. Similarly in Terror Bomber, the bad effect, 
killing the children, is a means to the good effect of shortening the war, even though it is 
not a means to the destruction of the munitions factory.16  
In both the trolley problem twin scenarios and in the terror bombing and strategic 
bombing twin scenarios, the overall good goal remains stable: shortening the war is both 
Terror Bomber’s goal and Strategic Bomber’s goal, and saving the five workers is the 
goal of the bystander in both Bystander at the Switch and Fat Man. But in my reading of 
Aristotle’s captain, saving the crew is not the overall goal in both cases, once pursued 
through bad means and the other time pursued through good or indifferent means but a 
bad side-effect.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I mention this because it is not clear that, in comparing the various examples with each other, 
shortening the war and not destroying the munitions factory should count as the good effect.  
	  
Journal of Ancient Philosophy  
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga 
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 20-48, 2014. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i1p20-48 
	  
	   39 
Ironically, though, it is not difficult to find the candidate reading of Aristotle’s 
example which is supposed to be equivalent to Terror Bomber and Fat Man so as to be 
contrasted with the side-effect case in which the captain operates a sudden turning 
manoeuvre in order to bring the ship in less dangerous waters while knowing that the 
sudden manoeuvre is likely to cause loss of cargo. The equivalent to Terror Bomber and 
Fat Man is just Aristotle’s original case, in which the captain throws goods overboard in 
order to save his crew. Recall Aristotle’s own words and contrast them to my side-effect 
reading of the scenario: 
Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a 
storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily; but on condition of its 
securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. (1110a5-20) 
Here we have a case in which the agent brings about the bad effect (throwing 
goods overboard) as a means to achieving the good effect – saving the crew. Contrast this 
with my reading in which the captain suddenly turns the ship in order to direct it towards 
safer waters while knowing that the sudden manoeuvre will likely result in loss of cargo.   
We have now identified two parallel scenarios – Aristotle’s original example and 
my sudden manoeuvre reading – which are equivalent to the classic twin cases in the 
double effect debate such as the Trolley Problem and Terror and Strategic Bomber in 
respect to a common good goal (saving the crew, saving the five, shortening the war). 
But, it may be objected, there is a difference between the two parallel scenarios from 
Aristotle and the others in the double effect literature: namely, the agents in the two 
parallel scenarios from Aristotle no longer perform the same action. One throws goods 
overboard, the other one suddenly turns the ship. But that’s not a problem because, even 
if indeed in Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber the two perform the same action of 
dropping bombs, in the Trolley Problem the two do not perform the same action, as the 
bystander in Bystander at the Switch must only flip a switch while the bystander in Fat 
Man must push the fat guy down the bridge. And it won’t do to insist that the Trolley 
Problem is still different because one can reformulate Fat Man so as to have the bystander 
just flip a switch which will cause the fat guy to fall off the bridge (see Kamm 2007, 
Otsuka 2008); because the same reformulation can be offered for Aristotle’s parallel 
examples, by stipulating, say, that the captain in both cases must just operate a lever, 
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which will in the one case direct the ship towards safer waters and in the other case throw 
goods overboard.17  
Summing up, then, we could read Aristotle’s throwing goods overboard example 
as the sort of case that is normally used in the debate on the Doctrine of Double Effect, 
but there are at least two important notes of caution against doing so: firstly, we have 
seen that in reading Aristotle’s example as a double effect-type scenario, it comes out that 
Aristotle’s own case, in its most basic and natural reading, is rather like the sort of cases 
that the Doctrine of Double Effect does not justify because they involve bad means to 
good ends, such as Terror Bomber and Fat Man. Still, we have put forward a plausible 
reading of Aristotle’s example where the bad effect (loss of goods) is not a means to the 
good effect (saving the crew).  
The second note of caution is related: the above implies that, on the most natural 
reading of Aristotle’s example, Aristotle gives the opposite verdict than the justifying 
verdict that the Doctrine of Double Effect normally gives to these examples. While the 
Doctrine’s verdict on the scenarios in which the bad effect is a means to the good end is 
that they cannot be justified, Aristotle’s verdict is that any sensible man would do it, 
which, in Aristotle’s language, ought to count as a moral justification. And, indeed, 
Aristotle’s verdict that any sensible man would do it also fits common moral intuition, as 
it would be preposterous to prioritise goods over people. Is that a point against the 
Doctrine of Double Effect’s verdict against cases in which bad means are chosen for good 
ends? Not really, because Aristotle’s example is different to the standard double effect 
examples in another important respect, its moral implications.  
In Aristotle’s example the agent must choose between goods and people, while in 
standard double effect scenarios the agent must rather choose between people and people: 
in the Trolley Problem it is a choice between the life of the one and the lives of the five. 
In Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber, it is a choice between the lives of the children 
and the lives that will be spared by shortening the war. So it is life against life in classic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Let me clarify my talk of the “same action” here: I am not referring to the action individuation 
debate nor do I mean the thick-thin action-type distinction by Wedgewood (2011): I simply mean 
that the kinds of movements involved are different, as in flipping a switch as opposed to pushing a 
person.  
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double effect scenarios18 while it is life against goods in Aristotle’s scenario. So the bad 
effect, in Aristotle’s scenario, is just too far, morally speaking, from the good effect – and 
that would explain why we find Aristotle’s verdict of moral permissibility plausible.   
 
5. Intended Means and Bad Effects 
Three aspects of this issue must be discussed:  
(1) Can we say that Aristotle’s example is a counterexample to the Doctrine of Double 
Effect because it posits a case in which it is just intuitively morally obvious that it is 
permissible to choose a bad means to a good end? 
(2) Can we reformulate Aristotle’s example so as to find the kind of moral balance 
between bad effects and good effects that we have in other double effect scenarios? 
(3) Aristotle’s other example, of having to do something base in order to save one’s 
family, may be more promising with respect to establishing the normal moral 
balance between bad effects and good effects that we find in standard double effect 
cases.  
Aristotle says that any sensible man would throw goods overboard to save his 
crew. This must imply that Aristotle had in mind goods whose moral value cannot be 
compared with the lives of crew members. As we already said, we must suppose that, 
were the captain not to throw goods overboard, the lives of crew members would be lost 
but the goods themselves would not be necessarily lost (if one were to suppose that the 
goods would be lost no matter what, then the situation is obviously relevantly morally 
different). Now suppose the goods in question are the only boxes still in circulation of 
some life-saving medicine. People will die if these goods were to be lost. Now, on this 
supposition, Aristotle’s example would have the sort of moral connotations of the 
standard double effect cases, where there is an alternative between life and life (see point 
(2) above). And then it is just a matter of getting the proportion right, according to 
Condition 4: “that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect” 
(1949: 43). In the Trolley Problem, the proportionately grave reason for permitting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The same is true of the abortion case and of self-defence, even though the case of death-
inducing pain-alleviation is slightly different: there it is life against pain. Still, that is also a case in 
which the most fundamental interests of persons are at stake, rather than, say, commercial 
interests.  
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evil effect of killing the one is the five lives that would be saved. In Terror Bomber and 
Strategic Bomber, the proportionately grave reason for permitting the killing of the 
children is the many lives that would be saved by shortening the war. Similarly, in 
Aristotle’s example, the proportionately grave reason for throwing goods overboard that 
would save the lives of some sick patients at home is saving the lives of the sailors.  
But what if the goods in questions were just, to use modern examples, mobile 
phones? Then, just as Aristotle says, any sensible man would throw them overboard to 
save the crew. But the moral imbalance between mobile phones and human lives is such 
that any sensible man would throw mobiles phones overboard to save the crew. The idea, 
here, is that if the proportionately grave reason is indeed grave enough (proportionately 
speaking, again), such as in the case of, say, the lives of 10 sailors against boxes 
containing hundreds of mobile phones, then it is irrelevant whether the throwing of the 
goods overboard is an intended means or a merely foreseen side-effect. Any sensible 
virtuous person would allow that throwing hundreds of mobile phones overboard to save 
the lives of 10 human beings is not just morally permissible but morally obligatory, and 
that such is the case even if throwing the goods overboard is indeed an intended means.  
The problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect seems to be that there must be some sort 
of minimal threshold for the sort of bad effects that are not allowed to be intended means; 
if just any bad effect is not allowed to be an intended means, then the Doctrine runs into 
some serious problems of plausibility (see point (1) above). Let us illustrate this by 
looking at the four conditions of Mangan’s classic definition: 
A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and a bad 
effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1) that the 
action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good effect 
and not the evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by means of 
the evil effect; 4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil 
effect (1949: 43). 
The point is that if the case of throwing mobile phones overboard as an intended 
means to save the lives of ten crew members cannot be morally justified by the Doctrine, 
then the Doctrine is implausible. Here a defender of the Doctrine will have to say that 
throwing mobile phones overboard is not an evil effect. And, indeed, one may want to 
argue that the loss of goods is not evil even if it has negative economic consequences that 
will affect the lives of human beings. But the problem with this reply is that, if throwing 
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goods overboard is not evil, then Aristotle’s case is no double effect scenario. And if 
throwing goods overboard is evil, then Aristotle’s case is a counterexample to the 
Doctrine because the Doctrine would not allow one to throw goods overboard in order to 
save the crew. As we saw, there are two possible ways to resist this conclusion, both of 
which are problematic: one could try to argue that throwing goods overboard is not an 
intended means to saving the crew – we saw a possible reading along these lines, even 
though the most basic and natural interpretation of Aristotle’s example is as an intended 
means.  
The other strategy consists in denying that the goods are morally irrelevant and 
suppose, for example, that they are indispensable medicines which will save lives. But 
that does not sit very well with Aristotle’s remark that any sensible man would throw the 
goods overboard. Here one would have to suppose that the medicines would save some 
lives but that the number of lives that the medicines would save is clearly inferior to the 
number of crew members that would die. On this interpretation, then, Aristotle’s case 
would be somewhat like Fat Man: there is a relatively clear utility on the side of the good 
effect (saving the five, saving the crew) but the Doctrine still says that the agent is not 
morally permitted to intervene because the agent would bring about an evil intended 
means (killing the fat guy, throwing the medicines overboard). Still, in Aristotle’s 
example, if the balance of utility is clear in favour of the lives of the crew, intuition still 
tells us that the agent is permitted to intervene (and, indeed, may be morally obligated to 
intervene) despite the fact that throwing goods overboard would be an intended means. 
So that the only way to get moral intuition on the side of the Doctrine of Double Effect, 
in this case (namely to deny that it is permitted to throw goods overboard), appears to be 
to stipulate that the number of sick people that would be saved by the medicines is clearly 
greater than the number of crew members that would be saved: namely, overturning the 
balance of utility. But that, and here we are back at the beginning, would mean that the 
case is not one of double effect because then Condition 4 would not be met as then there 
is no proportionately grave reason to permit the evil effect.  
What with Aristotle’s other example, having to do something base to avoid your 
family being killed (as of point (3) above)? “...if a tyrant were to order one to do 
something base, having one’s parents and children in his power, and if one did the action 
they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death...” (1110a5-20). This seems to 
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be indeed an example in which there is the kind of balance between good and bad effect 
which is typical of double effect cases. But this seems to be, again, a case in which the 
agent who would submit and do the base thing would do it as an intended means to the 
end of saving one’s family from the tyrant’s menace. 
Let us take stock of our argument so far: we have looked in some detail at two 
examples of mixed actions from Aristotle and we have compared them with the classic 
examples that are brought to bear in the double effect debate. We have found that 
Aristotle’s examples could be revised so as to be interpreted as the sorts of examples that 
the Doctrine of Double Effect could justify, but that the most basic and natural reading of 
Aristotle’s examples is one in which the agent brings about the bad effect (throwing 
goods overboard, doing something base) as an intended means to the good effect (saving 
the crew, saving one’s family).  
Now it may be objected to the claim that the most basic and natural reading of 
Aristotle’s example is as intended means to a good end that the debate on the Doctrine of 
Double Effect shows that the distinction between means and side-effects is itself 
problematic and that it can therefore not be argued, on grounds of the distinction between 
means and side-effects, that Aristotle’s cases are not structurally equivalent to standard 
double effect cases. Indeed, a lot of the debate around the Doctrine of Double Effect 
centres on whether it is at all possible to offer a coherent working distinction between 
intended means and merely foreseen side-effects.19 But that whole debate is beside the 
point here because, if we do give up on the distinction between intended means and 
merely foreseen side-effects (or on the moral relevance of such a distinction for moral 
permissibility and moral justification), then we are just giving up on the Doctrine of 
Double Effect as a whole because, as the four conditions of the Doctrine make clear, the 
Doctrine depends on the distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-
effects. So the option of denying the claim that Aristotle’s examples are cases of intended 
means on the grounds that there is no coherent working distinction between intended 
means and merely foreseen side-effects cannot rescue the thesis that Aristotle’s examples 
of mixed actions are cases of double effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I shall just mention some representative major contributions to this particular stream of the 
debate: Foot 1967, Bennett 1980, Quinn 1989, Boyle 1991, Marquis 1991, Fischer/Ravizza/Copp 
1993, McMahan 1994, McIntyre 2001, and Wedgewood 2011 (and I have already referred to my 
own work on the topic).  
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In conclusion, we have here investigated the possibility that Aristotle’s examples 
of mixed actions in NE III.1 could be early cases of double effect. We have found that 
Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions have some important features in common with 
standard cases of double effect such as, amongst others, Strategic Bomber and the Trolley 
Problem: examples of mixed actions, just like double effect cases, involve dilemma 
scenarios with both bad effects and good effects so that the agent cannot solve the 
dilemma without incurring in bad effects. We have also found, on the other hand, that 
there are some crucial difficulties in interpreting Aristotle’s two examples of mixed 
actions as genuine double effect cases; namely, as cases that the Doctrine of Double 
Effect could offer a moral justification for. Briefly, the most significant problem is that 
both of Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions appear to be cases where the agent brings 
about the bad effect as an intended means to the good effect. Summing up, then, 
Aristotle’s mixed actions cannot be justified by appeal to the Doctrine of Double Effect. 
And that, mind, may say more about the Doctrine of Double Effect than it does about 
Aristotle’s mixed actions.20 
 
Ezio Di Nucci 
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